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PROTECTING U.S. FLAG SHIPS AGAINST PIRACY
In the past six years there have been over 1700 pirate attacks
worldwide. In 2008 there were 115 attacks off Somalia’s coast with a
success rate of approximately 40 percent. In 2009 attacks along the
Somalia coast and in the Gulf of Aden averaged 2-3 daily. The April 8,
2009 attack on the U S flag Maersk Alabama; the heroic defense of the
ships by its crew, and later the rescue of her hostage Captain, focused
international attention on the problem.
In response to the Maersk Alabama attack President Obama
vowed to “halt the rise of piracy in that region.” His strategy is to
cooperate with other maritime nations in defeating piracy but left
unclear is how and at what cost. At present, some 20 warships of
various nations are patrolling Somalia/Gulf of Aden waters.
Suggested here is the World War II armed guard model wherein
the operation of a merchant ship was left to its crew while the defense
of the ship was tasked to naval armed guard personnel. The typical
Liberty ship was armed with a five inch gun on the stern, a three inch
gun on the bow and six 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. The total ship’s
complement was 41 merchant mariners and 20 naval armed guards.
When the navy armed guard was under staffed merchant seamen and
ship’s officers would fill the void. Routinely merchant seamen served as
backups to navy gunners.
Today the average merchant ship has a crew of 20-25 (the Maersk
Alabama had a crew of 20). Instead of separate armed guards, navy or
merchant, argued here is that a part of the regular merchant crew be
trained as armed guards. In addition to their regular shipboard duties,
five or six of the crew would weapons capable, that is, trained to use
the weapons carried on board as well as trained in ship defense tactics.
Seamen would be trained at existing maritime training schools
such as the world recognized Paul Hall Education Center operated by

the Seafarers International Union at Piney Point, MD. The necessary
training of ship’s officers could easily be done at any one of the six state
maritime academies. e.g. Maine Maritime Academy.
The cost of this option would include negotiated compensation
with the relative maritime unions , cost of defensive weapons, cost of
training, overtime cost of additional watch standers when the ship is in
known pirate waters, and the upgrade of the ship’s radar capability and
internal communication system. A not insignificant benefit of an armed
guard would be lower insurance costs.
The decision of whether to have an armed guard as part of the
crew on a particular voyage would be made by the ship owner.
Obviously, ships trading in secure waters would not need such
protection
If the above option is a reasonable option then it should be
compared to other options in terms of cost and sustainability. These
include (1) a land invasion of Somalia and afterwards an occupation
force. (2) convoying merchant ships in pirate waters, and (3) the
present option of multi-nation naval forces, mostly American, patrolling
pirate threaten waters.
The difficulty with the above three options is that the United
States would be expected, as in past similar situations, to be the lead
player and bear the brunt of the cost, even though American flag ships
operating in the region constitute a small part of the total tonnage at
risk. Simply stated, this is a case where America should go it alone and
protect its own shipping at a fraction of the cost of participating in a
large, multi-national, bureaucratic (what to do with a captured pirate?)
and very expensive naval presence in the area.

